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ABSTRACT  
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Out of the current sovereign debt crisis, the continuing debate over the proper role and 
responsibility of national institutions and priorities shaping the European Union’s response to the 
current fiscal and economic crisis flowing from the global “Great Recession”, is a growing 
concern for policy makers and scholars alike regarding the legitimacy of the EU.  The fear many 
hold is that the trust in the EU governance system has been seriously compromised in the eyes of 
the public across Europe. To many, it seems evident that the more the EU and European-level 
institutions struggle to navigate turbulent waters of the European financial crisis, the more the 
legal authority of the EU itself comes into question as both a legitimate and effective tool for 
easing the public’s anxiety over the present and future course of well-being. Manifestations of 
this include civil disturbances, electoral shifts among voters, government collapses, and most 
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dramatically, demonstrations of anti-system actors and strident and often virulent populist 
expressions by nationalist political parties on the fringes of European nation-states. Often 
overlooked in the contemporary analysis of these turbulent, somewhat confusing, and very 
challenging times is a fundamental question:  Is what appears on the surface to be a growing and 
clearly apparent erosion of the legitimacy of the European Union as both an appropriate and 
effective steward of public security and prosperity something genuine and real, or is the 
legitimacy of the EU as a governance system actually secure and largely intact despite surface 
disturbances growing out of the frustrations and disappointments of policy?   
 
The question is far more than rhetorical. If the EU governance system is a normal regime, 
understood in its basic sense, then it can and will absorb the expressions of discontent that color 
all stable and legitimate democratic regimes in times of unusual economic and social stress. It 
will confront such challenges as come with global financial shocks, banking system failures, 
austerity cuts to public welfare, and the shifting tides of partisan support across the nation-state 
polities within its domain of authority, and still enjoy a reasonably stable reservoir of legitimacy 
in the public’s opinion.  
 
This paper holds that the legitimacy of the EU rests fundamentally on a public belief in the trust 
extended by the public to the institutions and broader EU governance system as a means of 
managing European social conflict and economic prosperity.  However, in developing an 
empirical assessment of this proposition, we note important qualifications to the primary model 
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connecting public expressions of trust in the EU to perceived economic conditions at both the 
EU and nation-state level.  We segment the EU public into (1) “elites” and “non-elites” based on 
vocational status, (2) control for the public’s emotional symbolic resonance with the EU, and  (3) 
the “left-right” political ideology across the EU public. We expect that these filtering 
mechanisms – occupational status, emotional attachment, and political ideology -- have 
significant implications for conflict management and resolution which will challenge both 
national and EU-level political leadership. The study compares Eurobarometer data for two 
cross-sectional time points, 2006 and 2009, a particularly difficult and challenging period of time 
for the EU and its institutions and policy-making devices.  Following the analysis, we discuss the 
implications which these findings offer for the future specifically of European-level, and more 
generally, democratic governance. 
 
This paper will also provide necessary context to the challenges to European governance through 
the use of in-depth interviews of European experts and EU policy makers. This small, open-
ended data base will supplement the Eurobarometer survey data to provide perspective on the 
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, 2012 the world was taken aback by acts that had not been seen in France since 
the 1980s – the killing of school children and a Jewish Rabbi. It became clear: anti-Semitism 
remains alive, mainly from its own citizens: French stemming from former colonies who are 
predominantly Muslims. Episodes and examples of this “anti-system” protest are increasingly 
common in Europe.  While on the one hand these are social challenges to the nation-state in 
Europe growing from historical animosities and jealousies in the nation-state itself, it is 
increasingly apparent to many that the growth in these protests and populist political parties is a 
function of the very success of the EU itself – or at least, partial success.    
 
This example underscores what many argue is a rise in populist groups within the various EU 
member-states resulting from European financial crisis. Declining economic circumstances is 
usually one of the biggest suspects associated with rising tides of political anxiety as losers look 
for enemies, and winners in the process become targets of accusations. So the underlying 
question remains: in the face of this ongoing challenging governance crisis for the EU, can we 
know if the necessary support for the EU is firmly holding among the core public, or is there 
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evidence of unraveling not merely among more extremist or populist sectors of the publics across 
the EU but among the mainstream of the general public?    
 
Legitimacy of the EU in the context of globalism 
Legitimacy is a challenge to any governing system.  It requires government not merely act 
effectively to balance the various narrow interests of its citizenry, but simultaneously do so in a 
manner that enhances the community of interests, as well.  It further requires that the governance 
process itself comport with a set of norms and values deemed to be consistent with the culture of 
the community deferring to the decisions and choices of the governing. The European Union 
governing system presents a special case, for it is neither a constitutionally based system, yet it 
possesses much of the authority and resources of a legitimate governance system associated with 
a large, federal, nation-state.  The legitimacy of its governing system cannot be found in a 
specific founding act reflecting the will of a people or public who have opted for the system after 
consideration, and a public referred on the choice. Rather, its legitimacy depends upon a clear 
and straightforward bargain:  the nation-state surrender a good portion of its own sovereignty in 
order to gain more prosperity, more security, and more relevance in a global community than 




                                                          
1
 For a survey of the different interpretations of EU constitutionalism, see Wilkinson (2013).  Wilkinson draws 
explicit attention to the existing challenge to EU governance as a result of the lack of a founding act from which 
legitimacy commonly is assumed to emerge. As Wilkinson notes, legitimating issues are crucial because 
assumptions of what the EU “ought” to be remains inseparable from “what” the EU is.  For Wilkinson, “The right 
question is not therefore ‘what sort of polity is the European Union?’ but rather ‘what sort of polity it is becoming?” 
(Wilkinson, 2013, pg.192) 
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Some see this bargain as the very definition of a “post-national” culture within the new global 
environment nation-states and economic markets operate within the 21
st
 century.  Marchetti and 
Wihtol de Wenden, elaborate the various venues of global governance (2011). They reason that 
the European Union finds expression in the emerging norms implied by a supranational 
governance system intended to deliver services on behalf of the people, but not authorized 
directly by any public directly to do so on their behalf. In effect, Marchetti and Wihtol de 
Wenden argue that although the idea of transnational activism has been “long confined to a 
national dimension [it] has expanded through growing cross-border activism, the rise of 
permanent transnational networks and global ‘epistemic communities’” (Marchetti 2011, pg.18).  
 
The paradox seems to be that while global activism based on norms is the very ideal lying at the 
heart of the EU, the reality that follows logically from the ideal of a zero-sum relationship to the 
legitimacy of the nation-state.  They note that “while the issues that motivate the mobilization 
can be ultimately global (though very often mediated by national or local dimensions), the 
successful outcome of mobilizations is rooted in overlapping national and transnational domains 
of political action” (2011, pg.21). Therefore, nation-states need the supranational EU in order to 
secure the trans-national gains of a governance system and a continental market system while 
sustaining their national legitimacy. Nonetheless, they diminish claims to their sovereignty, (and 
logically legitimacy) the more they transfer authority to the very governance structure that 
secures their prosperity – the European Union.  
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The semantics of the entire process proves to be more than one reason why certain citizens of the 
European Union’s nation states judge that their identity and their voice will be lost. Although the 
European Union offers greater opportunities to wealth creation than a single nation-state can on 
its own, the paradox of legitimacy noted remains a singularly large challenge, one of a number 
“of major obstacles that activists face in building up cross-border relationships among 
organizations with different cultures and languages, and with limited resources” (Marchetti and 
Wihtol de Wenden  2011, pg.21).   
 
Globalization adds additional stresses which can aggravate existing disagreements on various 
governance issues (i.e. should the European Union get involved with ‘border control’ and does it 
not cross the line between the necessity of humanitarian aid and national views of certain nation 
states)? Certain NGOs can be seen as an example of these ‘fine-line’ walkers in the sense that 
“from radical antagonism to radical nationalism (not to mention criminal groups), those who 
have taken an oppositional stand to institutional politics have often [been] criminalized and 
marginalized from the political system” (2011, pg.24). Thus, financial crises are not the only 
challenges to face the EU governance system and institutions.  
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Catherine Wihtol de Wenden notes, « Les payes européens qui seront les plus touchés par les 
nouvelles demandes sont ceux qui ont des liens linguistiques, coloniaux, transnationaux 




The question posed earlier of what the European Union is becoming assumes special significance 
when considering the case of France. The very ideal of the Republique of France is that a 
republic requires a strong sense of identity built around a common core culture. Yet, France 
continues to face issues with anti-Semitism and racism and has a constant influx of immigrants 
from Northern Africa, who for various reasons (asylum seekers, better opportunities for jobs, 
etc.) realize that their closest and most feasible chances do in fact tie in with their old mother 
country. This causes issues as the European Union wishes to stand as a humanitarian figure but 
does not and cannot risk a) losing the support of the French nation state as it holds a great deal of 
power and weight in terms of financial assistance, etc. and b) does not want to give the 
impression of being overpowering. However, the normative premise underlying of the European 
Union was and still is to some extent to a) stabilize Europe (no more war, more economic and 
social coordination along lines of democracy and liberal values) b) minimize extremism c) create 
and keep efficient and rational markets and d) hold independence from US and other global 
hegemons. Therefore, some may argue that the European Union is walking a dangerously fine 
line at times and cannot push further toward supranational integration without bringing into 
                                                          
2
 Translation:  The European countries who will be the most affected by the new demands (i.e. asylum seekers) are 
the ones who have linguistic, colonial, transnational links (working migrations and already existing families) with 
the homes countries in crises. 
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question the idea of a legitimate Europe grounded in a legal tradition, equal to or superior to the 
member-states, and still be based on some notion of a European “people”.  
 
The problem defined 
The legitimacy of the European Union’s governance system rests on the argument that it is both 
more efficient and effective at delivery of the core needs of a nation-state (economic prosperity, 
economic and political stability, management of long-term goals and objectives associated with 
globalization, and improved quality of life conditions for its citizenry) than are nation-state 
governance systems alone.
3
  The basic core logic of the EU has always been that in terms of 
economics, it is offers scales of economy that cannot be matched by individual smaller nation-
states. The rules associated with the system have been shaped and enforced jointly through a 
multi-layered system of governance including national and EU-level political institutions and 
authorities. The legitimacy attached to the EU system of governance has always been assumed to 
be based on two dimensions:  (1) a performance, or instrumental dimension, and (2) a public 
sanctioned dimension (Scharpf, 2012). Absent of many of the normal avenues of public sanctions 
                                                          
3
 The literature on Euroscepticism and legitimacy issues facing the EU is extensive.  Typically, this literature has 
tied legitimacy to citizen identification with Europe and the European Union, in contrast to national identity and 
national patriotism. This study will not explore the broader issue of identity, although we will introduce the concept 
of one’s image of the EU as a reflection of the person’s symbolic bonding to the EU.  Recent contributions which 
have advanced the broader understanding of the factors influencing EU identity with important implications for the 
basis of EU legitimacy as a governing regime include van Klingeren, Boomgaarden and de Vreese (2013), Olsen 
(2013), Meier-Pesti and Kirchler (2003), Skinner (2013), Rosamond (2012), Serricchio, Tsakatika and Quaglia 
(2013), Roose (2013), and Duff (2013). This study will consider primarily what Klingren, following the example of 
Boomgarden and de Vreese (2013) the relationship between the “hard” factors influencing one’s assessment of the 
legitimacy of the EU and that person’s broader identity with the EU (namely, the economy), and the various “soft” 
factors of legitimacy and identity (namely, emotive attachments to the EU, such as trust and positive attachments 
and images of the EU).  
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typically anchoring nation-state authorities to their electorates (only members of the European Parliament 
of the major EU institutions are directly chosen and sanctioned by European electorates), the instrumental 
dimension of legitimacy has always been of crucial importance to the claim of those advocating more 
authority for the EU institutions relative to the nation-state.   Lipset’s (1964, pg. 64) widely 
referenced modern conception of legitimacy, captures the logic underlying the basis of EU 
legitimacy when he states that “legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and 
maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the 
society. The extent to which contemporary democratic political systems are legitimate depends 
in large measure upon the ways in which the key issues which have historically divided the 
society have been resolved”.  No doubt, resolving the conflict between Germany and France (that 
tore Europe apart for centuries) is an instrumental accomplishment that EU advocates can claim 
and thereby use to sustain a sense of legitimacy to the European-wide governance system.  
However, in the face of a deepening and broadening financial and economic crisis that defies an 
easy solution for the EU, and the challenges to the nation-states and members of it citizenry, as 
they face the new reality of open borders and respect for the free movement of peoples (as well 
as capital, service and goods), the anti-system political movements and political parties which 
are merging within Europe reflect more dramatic manifestations of growing challenges to the 
legitimacy of the European Union.  Following the logic of Lipset, this corresponds to a lack of 
belief that the EU is the appropriate set of institutions to manage the economy and society of the 
Europe today (since the European Union now captures the bulk of European space and 
populace). Thus, in the face of financial crisis and the lingering doubts about EU legitimacy, the 
broader sense that the EU governance system is just not up to the task (a concern that was vividly 
exposed during the constitutional debate in Europe in the several years preceding the financial 
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crisis of 2007), in which many argued that the EU must assume a more robust role in the 
governance affairs of nation-states across the EU. Yet, this strategy promises only to inflame and 
excite anti-system responses.  Thus, the very use of authority by the EU itself to meet the 
challenges of the sovereign debt crisis imperils the claim of the EU as a legitimate and relevant 
supranational governing authority in the lives of the citizens across the nation-states of the EU.  
It is perilously close to a simple Catch-22:  more EU without effect only confirms its 
“inappropriateness” underscoring a legitimacy deficit; less EU may well simply condemn the EU 
experiment to failure with dramatic attendant consequences for member nation-states, also 
mortally inflicting the legitimacy of the EU. 
 
The focus of the study 
Therefore, the central question this paper intends to examine is simply this:  in the face of this 
ongoing and challenging governance crisis for the EU, can we know if the necessary support for 
the EU is firmly holding among the core public, or is there evidence of unraveling not merely 
among more extremist or populist sectors of the publics across the EU, but within the 
mainstream of the public more broadly defined? To approach this question, we will examine the 
changing levels of trust across the EU public for the EU and its institutions of governance and 
assess whether this trust can be reasonably understood to be sufficient enough to sustain the 
public’s belief that the EU governance system is appropriate for solving various key social 
conflicts. We will also examine the degree of satisfaction with EU and national economic 
circumstances as a proxy for estimating whether such trust can be sustained and built upon, 
across the EU. We will assume that the “core” European public is divided into key stake holders 
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associated with occupational status, political ideology, and emotional ties and personal 
associations with the EU. We will compare and contrast models tying these filtering perspectives 
to trust in the European Union across two cross-sectional time-points with survey data taken 
from the Eurobarometer data collected at these two different cross-sectional points in time:  2006 
and 2009. This longitudinal comparison of cross-sectional survey data will allow us to gauge any 
shifts in the base of legitimacy for the EU associated with the time period dealing with both 
constitutional reform (i.e., the Lisbon Treaty of 2009) and the early stages of the global financial 
recession (which convention holds began in 2007).  
 
To provide invaluable context to supplement more systematic analysis of survey data employed 
in this study to answer these questions we will draw upon a small sample of in-depth open-ended 
interviews conducted by the author in Europe during the summer of 2012. Once having tested 
our models we will consider the implications of our findings for the legitimacy of EU authority 
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CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
The intent of this thesis is to determine whether there is enough perceived appropriateness and 
trust in the European Union governance system within a small set but key group of stake holders 
within European society. These three stake holds are those whose (1) occupational and 
vocational interests and skills are most likely to depend upon and benefit from the success of a 
European-wide governance system and economic market of transaction and trade, (2) normative 
orientations to politics which project clear prescriptive and proscriptive preferences for 
governance and economic strategies of welfare and prosperity, and (3) whose emotional bonding 
to the EU have drawn them into a personal identification with the EU and whose sense of 
security and stability may indeed be dependent upon their belief that the EU is still something 
positive and worth preserving and indeed expanding. The latter group are the loyalists.  One 
assumes that the “fair-weather” friends of the EU have no emotional stake in the EU’s progress 
and survival.  A loss of legitimacy among this segment of the European public is both expected 
and discounted by markets.  It is the loyalists whom pose a different issue.  Depending upon how 
broad their numbers are, they are the last redoubt of resistance to a “cut and run” attitude which 
dooms the survival of the common monetary system, and single market, and European-wide 
normative rules protected and managed by a European governance system designed to refine and 
enlarge the vision of Europe beyond petty national differences.  
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Stakeholders of the EU 
This study follows convention and divides the European public into two groups:  elite and non-
elite.
4
 For the purposes of this study, elites will be defined as those who hold what would be 
considered occupations requiring higher levels of educational training, professional licensing, 
accreditation, and which by necessity draw the person into the broader cross-border networks of 
European-wide market and professional services and interactions.  These are the holders of high 
“EU property stakes”, broadly defined.  Property stakes are what one has invested in the future of 
the system. Elites are those who are assumed to be more cosmopolitan and educated and may 
lean towards more dependency in the current system to achieve future ends, such as global 
benefits. In particular, economic elites have invested more than most as they are the ones who 




                                                          
4
   For a review of the literature and empirical research employing elite-public classifications of European publics, 
see Haller (2008, pp. 1-30). For a theoretical differentiation of elites, see Haller, pp. 31 – 57.  We draw on his 
distinction of “horizontal” elites, and in particular, “economic” elites as being the most relevant category of elite-
citizen classification for the purposes and focus of this paper.  The economic elites are those whose economic and 
capital stake are dependent upon the success of a single market, a common monetary union, and open borders 
allowing their entrepreneurial and professional skills to take full advantage of the expanded scale of the European 
economic network under one governance umbrella. 
5
 For a an overview of the role of occupational status as a concept within the literature on Euroscepticisim with 
implications explicitly for economic conditions within the EU and its broader linkages to rational choice 
interpretations underlying studies of citizenry perceptions of the EU, see van Klingen, Boomgarden and de Vreese 
(2013, pp. 3 – 5). Their findings suggest a lesser role of occupational status in defining one’s perception of the EU 
than our study expects to see in the data. Yet, their data (Eurobarometers for 1994 and 2005) cover a different period 
of history – though recent – and does not capture the accumulated impact of a constitutional debate and the onset of 
the economic and financial crisis afflicting the trans-Atlantic community between 2006 – 2009. In addition, the 
present study connects what they would label as “hard” and “soft” factors to a different measure of one’s perception 
of EU legitimacy.  As noted above, we are exploring the perception of EU public in the appropriateness of the EU as 
a governing regime (following Lipset’s conceptualization of legitimacy), not a more “instrumental” assessment of 
whether the country has “benefitted” or not from EU membership, as do van Klingen, Boomgarden and de Vreese.  
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This position is important because it goes to the core of understanding and analyzing the 
legitimacy of the European Union governance system. It is unlikely that anything the European 
Union does is legitimate in terms of policy making if the constituents favor their own national 
governing system to the EU. The elites and the public will not trust the EU Commission, for 
example, if they prefer a more nationalistic view on legitimacy. Through our recent field 
research we conclude that generally speaking the system of governance is not up to the task and 
that there is a need for political integration because the system lacks output delivery. 
 
Various studies have explored the roots of different perceptions of the EU among elite and non-
elite citizens within Europe.  Rosamond (2012) has argued that unlike the elites, the public tends 
to look for more short term solutions and investments which clearly then draws on definite 
tensions over what authority means and to whom it should rest on. Since the feeling of identity 
among both the public and the elites is dependent to whom they will defer the authority, it can be 
said that legitimacy, deference and identity are interconnected. In fact, legitimacy depends on 
identity and vice versa. Rosamond declares that “The first of these axioms is the idea that 
[economic patriotism] involves discourses and practices that are necessarily protectionist and 
contrary to the premises of economic liberalism. The second is the intuitive understanding of EP 
as an exclusive property of nation-states and of national economic space” (Rosamond 2012, pg. 
324-25). In this context he explains that an economic patriotism is in and of itself nationalism.  
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Economic patriotism holds value in the betterment of the nation and is dependent upon the 
nation-state for policy and decision making. With this being said, nations that hold this type of 
self-determined interest in the betterment of their nation-state will identity under the ‘pro-
nationalist’ category. As a result, they can be seen as harder to cooperate within matters of 
‘European’ issues, if there is no seen gain or benefit in their involvement.  From our perspective, 
Rosamond’s notion of economic patriotism is something akin to the general citizenry's 
attachment to local, regional and nation-state economies and not consistent with elites’ view that 
such domains while important to public wealth and social security, are wholly insufficient to 
meet the challenges of a global society and therefore, insufficient for the economic skills, market 
resources, and professional credentials elites possess.  
 
Vala, Pereira and Ramos (2006) add further dysfunction to the elite-citizenry distinction. They 
explore the relationship and correlation of nation-states within the European Union and their 
attitudes towards racial prejudice, threat perception and opposition to immigration. They 
asked“…what factors lead to the construction of immigration as a threat and not as a new 
resource, or even as a motive of pride for the populations of the receiving countries?”  (2006, pg. 
119)  
 
Their results “suggest that attitudes towards immigration are associated with racial ideology and 
with ‘ethnism’ (2006, pg.136). It is inevitable to counter argue though, “that opposition to 
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immigration is anchored in the perception of not only at an economic and security level, but also 
in the identity sphere” (2006, 136). Lastly, their findings help explain the current rise in 
nationalism and the issues surrounding the well-known Franco-German relations when finding 
out that results suggest an extreme contrast between the two countries when it comes to attitudes 
towards immigrants. “As expected, ‘ethnism’ in the selection of immigrants is higher in 
Germany, but the feeling of cultural threat is lower in this country than in France” (2006, 
pg.137).  
 
Although only mentioned briefly, the true perception of threat deals with the issue of identity in 
the realms of the public versus elite. This paper will examine whether or not the expectations and 
the outcomes of the EU governance system are congruent in the eyes of its citizenry. How far 
away or close is the majority of the category to the European Union and the concept of a unified 
Europe or to one’s own perceptions of what can be trusted as legitimate towards European 
political authority?  
 
Vivien A. Schmidt (2010) draws our attention to the desire to find the solution to the gap 
between cooperation of the public and the elites and the role of a basic ‘customer satisfaction’ 
ideology. If the public is involved with the elites and their decision making, then there is a direct 
correlation of positive cooperation on the European Union level. Schmidt (2010, pg.1) notes that 
“…scholars have analyzed the EU’s democratic legitimacy mainly in terms of the trade-offs 
between the output effectiveness of EU’s policies outcomes for the people and the input 
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participation by the people” Although there is a discrepancy in this as it asks for participation 
from the people and although this participation can be seen as a measurement of successful 
cooperation, it is not something easily willed.  She also points out that“…big legitimacy 
problems remain, first, with the institutional rules, in particular the fact that once decisions are 
made, they are nearly impossible to overturn by the member-states in the Council…” (Schmidt 
2010, pg.17).  
 
If the public in a nation-state felt that their elected elites within the Council were being stripped 
away of their rights of opinions and a voice, they would feel in a sense, left out. A part of their 
identity that was shared with the elites, and indirectly the European Union itself, would be seen 
as removed. This feeling would then draw those who were cooperative away and we would be 
faced with a body of pro nation-state citizens, and worse the masses of a public have always 
outnumbered that of the elites.   
 
Nonetheless, it is vital to remember that the seen ‘elites’ be also considered in the question of 
identity. More often than not, they can be seen as figures that would automatically side with the 
European Union, due to acts of ‘bandwagon’. After two world wars, the idea of peace is 
something everybody sought out.  One expert interviewed from the summer interviews noted that 
“the politicians [could] feel a great distance since they seem to not see their influence on the 
greater aspect of the EU. They have more power with their voters back home”. As a result, the 
necessity to keep an open mind about the various ways the public and the elites can draw their 
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sentiments of identity from are numerous. Through these governance mechanisms there can be a 
lot of gaps and communication is not the easiest. The European Union’s basis of governance off 
of treaties is something long withheld so as to bring nation-states together but through the 
various drawing boards it may have split them up instead. 
 
The next additional stakeholder is accounted for in this analysis, having particular relevance to 
issues cementing nominal assessments of the EU to evaluations of the instrumental performance 
of EU governance.  The group consists of those who exhibit some personal bonding identity with 
the EU.  Symbolic perceptions show how individuals have attached to European Union symbols 
through personal and emotional attachments. We posit that they are much more likely to hold 
more confidence and trust in the institution and identify more with Europeanism than the general 




The last additional stake holder is those in the European society whose normative preferences 
and empirical assessments are shaped in accordance with a constrained logic aligned with a 
“left” and “right:” political perspective.  Political ideology is at the very core of one’s calibration 
                                                          
6
 The literature on national symbols, emotional attachment via symbols, and feelings of identity and patriotism may 
be found in many different fields of study, including psychology, sociology, and political science. Recent empirical 
and theoretical research on the subject include Butz (2009), Schatz and Lavine (2007), Meir-Pesti and Kirchler 
(2003), Vignoles, et. al. (2006).  
  23 
 
of how appropriate governing institutions perform, as well as how effective these institutions are 













                                                          
7 The ideological “left” and the “right” within Europe’s political spectrum have long taken divergent views across 
nation-state regarding the EU and its instrumental benefits to citizens.  These differences have also been associated 
by a number of students of EU politics resonating with core normative values of the relationship between the citizen, 
the state and the market. See Usherwood and Startin (2013) for an analysis of how these ideological differences have 
come into play during the recent economic and financial crises in Europe. 
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CHAPTER III 
MODELS, DATA, OPERATIONALIZATIONS  
 
The working proposition guiding this paper holds that the legitimacy of the EU rests 
fundamentally on a public belief in the appropriateness of the EU governance system as a means 
of managing social conflict and economic prosperity (national security is excluded from this set 
as the EU has no direct authority over the nation’s security of nation-states and the public).  We 
refine this argument to assert that the public trust granted to the EU governance system is 
qualified across the public by how various stake-holders filter their assessments of EU 
performance and from this formulate their conception of trust.  These filters define the lines 
separating elements of the European public into those who have a high property stake in the 
success of the EU (e.g., those whose occupational status place them at the heart of the broader 
European single market and common monetary union), those to whom the EU fulfills both 
normative and empirical expectations regarding the political-economic and social organization of 
society (e.g., the left-right ideological disposition of a citizen), and those who may have moved 
beyond specific instrumental and normative assessments of the EU as a governance system to 
embrace more emotional, and basic symbolic representations of the EU, either as something 
positive and good, or negative and bad (e.g., those holding very strong emotional symbolic 
attachment to the EU).  
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The argument summarized 
The basic working hypothesis of this study holds that levels of legitimacy in the form of trust in 
the EU held by citizens of Europe is a function of the citizen’s perception of the instrumental 
performance of the broader economic environment within the country, and across Europe, as 
well.  We assume trust to be a reflection of the person’s view that the governance system is 
appropriate to the instrumental task before it – namely, national and trans-European economic 
prosperity, stability and security.  We elaborate further by postulating that crucial filters in the 
public’s eye (e.g., occupational status, political ideology and one’s overall attachment to the very 
symbolic notion of the EU itself) modifies the core relationship between assessments of the EU 
instrumental performance and the legitimacy extended the EU (i.e., trust in the EU and 
perceptions of national and European economic conditions). We expect that elites will express 
more trust than non-elites, that the “right” will probably extend more trust to the EU than the 
political “left” (given the EU’s traditional classic liberal economic philosophy regarding 
prosperity), and that those with strong positive images of the EU will indeed tend to trust the EU 
much more than those without such positive dispositions toward the EU.  These hypotheses are 
spelled out on Model 2 in Table 1.  And finally, we hold that such modifying effects will hold up 
regardless of the respective perceptions of the current economic situation in Europe or the 
nation-state. Therefore, we assert that instrumentalities should not in general push the public off 
track given their primary structural disposition toward the EU.  Good times or bad, the non-elite 
will trust less than the elite, political “left” will trust less than the political “right”, and those 
attached to the EU will trust more than those absent of such positive attachments.   
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If these hypotheses, as explicitly stated in Table 1 are verified, we may conclude EU legitimacy 
is a work in progress that cannot simply be won through instrumental successes.  The governance 
regime must look to various stake holders as more or less willing to extend the EU the necessary 
trust upon which the legitimacy of the EU will stand, and which confirms the public’ assessment 
that the EU itself is an appropriate system to manage the instruments of policy and progress 
across Europe. If in general our hypotheses are not readily confirmed, one must conclude that 
either (1) instrumentalities themselves do not matter,  (2) legitimacy is denied (no trust) or, (3) 
legitimacy is uniformly distributed across the various stakeholders in identical proportions given 
instrumentalities (trust prevails).   
 
We add, of course, the time factor, and posit that in the context of unusually distressful and 
challenging times for the European public across the nation-states of the EU, one should expect 
to see a shift in expressions of trust as we move from 2006 into 2009.  Nonetheless, if trends 
prevail across both time periods in rough approximation to each other, we may conclude that 
turbulence is of limited importance to the core foundations of establishing legitimacy.  Either 
legitimacy prevails in both periods, or it does not.  However, if we note a pattern in 2006 and a 
different pattern in 2009 we must also conclude that legitimacy is indeed dependent upon the 
nature of shifting fortunes.  If, as we expect, legitimacy of the EU is sustained based on the  
individual level Eurobarometer data, we may say with greater confidence that the governance 
regime of the EU is in fact a work in progress (legitimate to some, not yet to others given the 
instrumentals coloring their perceptions), but that the foundations for further extending the 
perception in the public of the EU as an appropriate governance system are well in place as it can 
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withstand the traumas of constitutional debate and the onset of a great recession and not see 
legitimacy eroded entirely. Friends, who are not fair weather, represent the foundations of a 
normal governance system.  
 
The argument specified in Models 
Table 1 presents the models and their respective hypotheses guiding our analysis. Model 1 
evaluates an individual’s trust in the EU to their evaluation of the current economic situation of 
their country (Hypothesis 1a), i.e. their satisfaction. It tests research hypothesis that trust is 
conditional by circumstance. Hypothesis 1b posits that trust in EU is also conditional by 
satisfaction with outputs from the EU.  
 
Model 2 begins our analysis of the relationship between occupational status (Hypothesis 2a), 
political ideology (Hypothesis 2b) and images of the EU (Hypothesis 2c) on the one hand, with 
trust in the EU on the other.   
 
Model 3 and Model 4 each introduces controls into the analysis. Specifically, controls for the 
person’s assessment of the current national economic situation (Model 3), and the current 
European economic situation (Model 4).  Returning for a moment to Lipset’s conceptualization 
of legitimacy, we note that one’s trust in the EU (as a measure of legitimacy, per se) if based on 
instrumental assessments of the EU, will vary relative to the assessment one holds of the national 
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current economic situation within a country, as well as the current economic situation of Europe 
in general (and by association, the European market and monetary governance space). On the 
other hand, if we find that the variance pattern between trust in the EU and any of the filters 
(occupational status, political ideology, and images of the EU) is unaltered regardless of the 
economic condition, we may conclude that legitimacy perceptions across the three stake holders, 
including elites and non-elites, are structural relationships independent of the instrumental 
performance of the EU.   
 
As Table 2 notes, we will utilize Eurobarometer data from 2006 (Eurobarometer 66.1), and 2009 
(Eurobarometer 71.3).
8
 The study will utilize basic cross tabulation of data in testing the 
bivariate and simple control models outlined in Table 1. All models will be tested using 




                                                          
8
 Antonis Papacostas, Eurobarometer 66.1, European Values and Societal Issues, Mobile Phone Use, and Farm 
Animal Welfare, September – October 2006 (ICPSR 21281); and, Antonis Papacostas, Eurobarometer 71.3, 
Globalization, Personal Values and Priorities, European Identity, Future of the European Union, Social Problems 
and Welfare, and European Elections, June – July 2009 (ICPSR 28184). While the basic time frame was selected to 
capture the particular stresses and challenges associated with the debates over EU constitutionalism and the 
beginnings of the financial crisis (pre-Greece financial collapse of 2010), the specific Eurobarometers were selected 
based on exact matches of survey items asked of respondents in the two surveys.  Later Eurobarometers that may 
have been more ideal for capturing the full effects of the financial crisis are not yet unembargoed by the 
Commission of the EU, cleaned and released for public analysis by the ICPSR. 
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CHAPTER IV   
ANALYSIS  
 
The following section will report the results of the analysis of each of the hypotheses noted in 
Table 1.  Following this section, we will consider the implications of the findings. 
 
Findings From Analysis of Model 1:  Trust and Economic Situations 
Our analysis of Hypothesis 1a reveals that one’s trust in the EU is conditioned by one’s 
assessment of the current national economic situation. Thus, legitimacy, to the extent it is 
represented by one’s trust in the European Union, is directly tied to the citizen’s assessment of 
the instrumental performance of the national economy.  For both 2006 and 2009, as shown in 
Tables 3 and 4, the majority of the public in our European sample tend to express more trust in 
the EU institutions (58% and 56% as seen in Tables 1a and 1b) than non-trust. Moreover, we see 
one’s trust is directly tied to one’s assessment of the current economic conditions in the national 
economic situation. Poor assessments lead to sharp declines in trust; more positive assessments 
correlate with large degrees of trust across the European public in general. This trend is slightly 
more robust in 2009 than in 2006 reflecting the impact of the great recession in combination with 
failed institutional reforms associated with the European Constitution.    
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Tables 5 and 6 confirm for 2009 the same trend shown in Tables 3 and 4 hold up in 2009. 
Indeed, assessments of the European economic condition weigh heavily on an individual’s trust 
in EU institutions, much more than is the case for national economic conditions as show in 
Tables 3 and 4. Whereas, the differential in relative trust levels among individuals who assess the 
national economic situation differently (good v. bad) is only in the range of 10-15 percentage 
points as is shown in Tables 3 and 4. The respective levels of trust extended to the EU across 
those assessing the European economic condition as good or bad is in the range of 20-30 
percentage points. In Table 5, we note that for 2006 there is clearly a 30 percentage point gap 
between people assessing the European economic condition as good or bad and the degree of 
trust and non-trust extended to the EU. This pattern is virtually the same in Table 6 for our 2009 
European sample.  
 
Thus, from Tables 3-6 we can conclude that the trust in the European Union shown by citizens of 
the EU is very much attached in the public’s mind to their perceptions of the condition of the 
European economy. It seems clear from these tables that the hypotheses in Model 1 are 
supported:  the public clearly holds the EU accountable for economic performance at the 
European level, arguably a reasonable and sound position given what the founders and 
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Findings from analysis of Model 2: stake holders and trust 
Table 3-6 confirm the baseline relationship between public trust of the EU, as a measure of EU 
legitimacy, is tempered by the public’s perception of the prevailing economic situation at both 
the national and especially the EU level. However, we ask whether trust levels vary across 
different groups of stake holders.  We begin first with occupational status and consider whether a 
person’s trust in the EU depends upon whether they are elite or non-elite with regard to property 
stakes in the EU.  Tables 7 and 8 confirm Hypothesis 2a. Elites in both 2006 and 2009 are much 
more likely to extend trust to EU institutions, although the differences between elites and non-
elites are not dramatic. Nonetheless, both tables demonstrate a statistically significant 
relationship between occupational status and trust in EU institutions. Tables 7 and 8 also confirm 
that for those citizens in occupations which we argue are more likely to be central to the ideals 
associated with the European wide open-markets, trust in the EU is more common than among 
those occupations tending to remain attached to the proximate environment of a local or national 
economy.  
 
Next, we explore whether trust varies with political ideology.  We expect that those on the 
political “right” will have a closer affinity to the ideals of a liberal, open-market EU than those 
on the political “left”.  Tables 9 and 10 confirm a clear distinction between ‘left’ and ‘right’ 
political ideologies and the citizen’s trust in EU. Hypothesis 2b is therefore confirmed. Those on 
the ‘right’ of the political spectrum, in both 2006 and 2009, are slightly more trusting of the EU 
than are those on the left scale of the political spectrum. Tables 9 and 10 therefore underscore the 
impression held by many that the political “right” identifies and trusts the liberal economic 
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orientation of the EU as reflected in the European ideal of the free movement of goods, services, 
capital and people, while those on the ‘left’ see the open economy of the EU single market and 
monetary union as a threat to their livelihood and cultural-economic values.  
 
Finally, Tables 11 and 12 vividly demonstrate a strong and robust relationship between one’s 
image conjured of the EU and their trust extended to the EU. As one might expect, the symbolic 
attachment of the individual to the EU almost certainly invests something of the person’s identity 
and ergo to the image of the EU, whatever image that might be. If it is a positive image trust is 
readily forthcoming; if it is a negative image trust is dramatically withheld. Since all else is equal 
there can be no mistake that favorable images of the EU reinforced by symbols and general 
representations of the EU pay profound dividends of trust to the EU.   
 
Findings from analysis of Model 3:  stake holders and trust, by national economy 
Tables 13 and 14 align with the effects of the great recession and frustrations over the debate 
surrounding the European Constitution that colored the political narratives between 2006 and 
2009. In Table 13 (top section) we note that when the one’s assessment of the national economic 
situation in 2006 is “good” there is no difference between those who are ‘elites’ and those are 
‘non-elites’ with respect to trust in the EU. However, in 2006 when the assessment of the current 
national economic situation is bad (bottom section of Table 13) ‘elites’ express a fairly robust 
trust of the EU, to a notably greater degree than ‘non-elites’ (61% to 51%, respectively). The chi-
squares for the two groups of assessments in Table 13 (p = .289, p = .002, respectively) 
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underscore this sharp deviation in trust attached to one’s perceptions of the national economic 
situation in 2006.  
 
Moving to Table 14 we can see the trend of divergence of ‘elites’ and ‘non-elites’ continuing 
across both “good” and “bad” assessments of national current economic situation for 2009. 
However, what is notable in Table 14 is the overall decline in the assessment of the national 
current economic situation by both ‘elites’ and ‘non-elites’. In 2006, as shown in Table 13, 
almost 50 percent of the public in general (not controlling for elite/non-elite) assessed the current 
national economic situation as “good” or “bad” (N = 12.659, with 49.7% assessing national 
economic situation as “good”, and 50.3% assessing the national economic situation as “bad”).  
By 2009, more than three times as many European citizens assessed the current national 
economic situation as “bad” (78%, N = 10,694) as “good” (22%, N = 3,035). Nonetheless, 
whether the citizens’ assessment of current national economic situation is “good” or “bad”, 
‘elites’ were clearly more willing to trust the EU by a slight degree, but a statistically significant 
degree, than were the ‘non-elites’. We note from Tables 13 and 14 that in “bad” times ‘elites’ are 
the source of the EU’s legitimacy within the public and that since the onset of both the great 
recession in 2007 and the failed constitutional  reform of 2004-2009, ‘non-elites’ have clearly 
withheld their trust in the EU to a greater extent than the ‘elites’. Therefore, we conclude that 
hypothesis 3a is on the whole confirmed by the data.  
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Turning to political ideology, we note that in Tables 15 and 16, regardless of one’s assessment of 
the current national economic situation in 2006 or 2009, European citizens on the ‘right’ side of 
the political ideological scale considerably extend trust to the EU more than do those of the ‘left’ 
side of the politically ideological scale. It is difficult to conclude from these findings that the 
political ‘left’ or ‘right’ modifies their trust in the EU depending upon economic circumstances.  
Hypothesis 3b is therefore confirmed. 
 
Like political ideology, conjured images of the EU are not impacted by one’s assessment of the 
current national economic situation in either 2006 or 2009. As confirmed in Tables 17 and 18, 
regardless of one’s assessment of the current national economic situation, positive images of the 
EU correlate strongly with trust in the EU. The turbulences between 2006 and 2009 seemingly 
did nothing to dent the legitimacy of the EU in the eyes of those who have positive images of the 
European Union. Tables 17 and 18 confirm Hypothesis 3c.    
 
Findings from analysis of Model 4: stake holders and trust, by European economy 
Tables 19 and 20 demonstrate the sharp differences between ‘elites’ and ‘non-elites’ in extending 
their trust in the EU when they assess the European economic situation to be “bad”. This reflects 
again the pattern shown in Tables 13 and 14 which confirm that when non-elites’ assessment of 
the national economic situation is “bad”, their trust in the EU declines sharply, unlike the ‘elites’ 
who despite their assessment of the current national economic situation as "bad" retain their 
distinctive trust in the EU. From Tables 19 and 20 it is clear that ‘elites’ continue to sustain their 
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trust in the EU even when assessing the current European situation as “bad”, whereas ‘non-
elites’ withhold their trust when they assess the current European situation as “bad”. As is shown 
in Table 20, by 2009 ‘elites’ and ‘non-elites’ alike disproportionately extend their trust to the EU 
during what they assess as “good” conditions within the current European economic situation. 
Virtually equal proportions of ‘elite’ and ‘non-elite’ expressed trust in 2009 and assessed the 
current European economic situation to be "good" (77% and 73%, respectively). However, when 
assessments among the public of the current European economic situation were “bad”, elites 
were far more likely to extend their trust to the EU than were the elites (53% v. 47%, 
respectively). Tables 19 and 20 underscore the general conclusion that one’s occupational status 
is a significant factor in providing the support for European Union legitimacy. Property stakes 
through occupational status consistently show throughout our analysis to be powerful and 
important underpinnings of trust extended the EU. Therefore we may conclude that Hypothesis 
4a is confirmed.  
 
Tables 21 and 22 once again verify that in general the relationship between political ideology 
and trust in the EU as shown previously in Models 1, 2 and 3, are modified by perceptions of 
economic assessments. However, there is one telling exception. We note that in Table 21 (2006) 
there is a statistically insignificant difference in the tendency to express trust in the EU for the 
‘right’ or the ‘left’ when citizen assessments of the current European economic condition are 
“bad”. This finding however, is not repeated in the 2009 sample (Table 22). By 2009, in the face 
of the challenging conditions of failed constitutional reforms and the great recession, the ‘right’ 
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once again tended to express a greater willing to trust the EU than the ‘left’ in degrees that are 
statistically significant. So therefore, we may conclude that overall, Hypothesis 4b is confirmed.  
 
Turning to Tables 23 and 24 we note that consistent with Models 2 and 3, positive images of the 
European Union steadfastly support and sustain trust in the EU regardless of one’s assessment of 
the current European economic situation. This despite the fact that for this sample of citizens by 
2009 (as shown in Table 24 with a margin of 2:1), citizens viewed the current European 
economic condition to be “bad”. The data therefore confirms Hypothesis 4c. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY & CONCLUSION 
 
Lying behind the theory, models and analysis of this paper lies a simple question:  is the EU 
plagued by fair-weather friends, or does it enjoy trust among important stake holders from whom 
trust and the foundations of legitimacy can sustain the governance regime of the EU as its moves 
forward in the future with the challenges associated with the post-recession reforms and 
innovations required by the new global economic and financial conditions?   From our analysis 
presented above, the answer is an unqualified “yes”.  Elites, the political “right” and those who 
have bonded through positive images of the EU, ostensibly constructed through symbolic images 
that generate the personal rewards of identification crucial to any governing system vis-à-vis its 
citizenry, are all reservoirs of trust and sources of validation of the EU as an appropriate 
governing regime. These groups extend their support and trust regardless of the instrumental 
circumstances of the period.  
 
The conclusions are based upon Eurobarometer data from both 2006 and 2009.  These data 
represent the most recent available data allowing a sample of respondents at two time points 
affording us an estimate of the effect of the greatest economic crisis in the Western world since 
the 1930s upon the public within the European Union. Although we have categorized our data in 
factors of symbolic attachment, ideology and occupation, the end result can be seen most clearly 
and bluntly by examining data from Model 1c and 1d. Although 2009 can be seen as falling 
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within the beginning phase of the economic crisis effecting the European Union, it is astounding 
how even though the public may view the current economic crisis in the European as “bad”, a) 
trust in EU institutions and b) more trust in 2009 than in 2006 (35% in 2006 versus 49.3%) is 
confirmed by the data.  
 
Lying beneath these facts are the core conclusions:  (1) trust depends upon certain stake holders, 
whose trust (2) is continual despite economic circumstances, at least during the period 2006 – 
2009, and (3) withheld trust comes from the ‘non-elite’ occupational group, those on the political 
‘left’ who have traditionally sought social security through public redistribution, and those who 
stand apart from the EU by virtue of lacking an emotional and personal attachment to the 
European experiment in supranational governance. These are the groups whose circumstances 
may be most threatened by the failure of European laws to be ensconced within a constitutional 
document, and whose livelihoods are most vulnerable to the economic uncertainties of the “Great 
recession”. In this context, our findings raise two fundamental questions:  (1) why should it be 
any surprise to anyone that “austerity” is a preferred policy of the European Commission (among 
others) in its struggle to combat the financial crisis, given the political “right” support of the EU, 
and the trust afforded the EU from those probably least vulnerable to the effects of classical 
liberal economic systems; and (2) why should one assume the commitment to austerity as a 
policy course to the future as a means of dealing with the financial crisis of 2007 – 2012, rapidly 
expending EU legitimacy when such a steadfast reservoir of trust continues to emanate from 
those to who a symbolic attachment to the EU has survived constitutional crisis and economic 
shock on the scale of the current market collapse of the Atlantic community?  Our findings 
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suggest caution to those prognosticating an end to the common monetary union and an overall 
rejection of the experiment in European integration. These arguments were echoed also in the 
interviews of the summer of 2012 during the credit crisis following Italy’s financial troubles 
where the common assumptions of the experts interviewed were that the EU was in dire trouble. 
Our findings, however, remind us that reservoirs remain in specific stakeholders. The core of 
importance remains in important stakeholders and has been sustained, at least since the initial 
phases of Europe’s most serious post-Cold War. A building cannot stand without its foundation, 
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CHAPTER VI  
TABLES & MODELS  
Table 1  
 




Trust in the EU as a Function of Assessments of the Current Economic Situation in Europe and the Nation-
State  
 
Hypothesis 1a One’s Trust in the EU is Conditioned by One’s Assessment of the Current National 
Economic Situation 
Hypothesis 1b One’s Trust in the EU is Conditioned by One’s Assessment of the Current Economic 
Situation in Europe 
Model 2: 
 
Trust in the EU as a Function of Filtering Perspective 
 
Hypothesis 2a One’s Trust in the EU is a Function of Occupational Status 
Hypothesis 2b One’s Trust in the EU is a Function of Political Ideological Perspective 
Hypothesis 2c  One’s Trust in the EU is a Function of One’s Affinity Towards the European Union 
Model 3: 
 
Trust in the EU as a Function of Filtering Perspective Conditioned by the Current National Economic Situation 
 
Hypothesis 3a One’s Trust in the EU is a Function of One’s Occupational Status, Controlling for One’s 
Assessment of the Current National Economic Situation 
Hypothesis 3b One’s Trust in the EU is a Function of One’s Political Ideological Perspective, 
Controlling for One’s Assessment of the Current National Economic Situation 
Hypothesis 3c One’s Trust in the EU is a Function of One’s Affinity Towards the European Union, 
Controlling for One’s Assessment of the Current National Economic Situation 
Model 4: 
 
Trust in the EU as a Function of Filtering Perspective Conditioned by the Current Economic Situation in 
Europe 
 
Hypothesis 4a One’s Trust in the EU is a Function of One’s Occupational Status, Controlling for One’s 
Assessment of the Current Economic Situation in Europe 
Hypothesis 4b One’s Trust in the EU is a Function of One’s Political Ideological Perspective, 
Controlling for One’s Assessment of the Current Economic Situation in Europe 
Hypothesis 4c One’s Trust in the EU is a Function of One’s Affinity Towards the European Union, 
Controlling for One’s Assessment of the Current Economic Situation in Europe 
 





Primary Concepts Variables, and Respective Operationalizations and Measurements 





Variables Operationalizations and Measurements 
EU Legitimacy Trust the EU Q: Please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend 
not to trust it.  




Assessment of the 
Current National 
Economic Situation 
Q: How would you judge the current 
situation, in the situation of the national 
economy?  
Choices: Very good, Rather good, Rather bad, 
Very bad  
Recode: 1=Good, 2=Bad 
Distal Economic 
Context 
Assessment of the 
Current Economic 
Situation in Europe 
Q: How would you judge the current 
situation, in the situation of the European 
economy?  
Choices: Very good, Rather good, Rather bad, 
Very bad  
Recode: 1=Good, 2=Bad 
Elite Status Occupational Status Q: What is your current occupation?  
Recode: 1= Elite (Professional, Business 
Proprietors, Employed Professional, General 
Management),  2=Non-Elite (Farmer, 
Fisherman, Shop-owner, Middle 
Management, Desk Position, Traveling, 
Service, Supervisor, Skilled Manual, 
Unskilled Manual, Never Employed) 
Political Ideology  Political Ideology Q: In political matters people talk of "the left" 
and "the right". How would you place your 
views on this scale?  
Recode: 1= Left (1-5), 2= Right (6-10) 
Affinity Towards the 
EU 
Conjured Images of the 
EU 
Q: In general, does the European Union 
conjure up for you a very positive, fairly 
positive, neutral, fairly negative or very 
negative image? 
Recode: 1= Positive (Fairly, Very), 2= 
Neutral, 3= Negative (Fairly, Very) 
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Table 3: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Assessment of  
the Current National Economic Situation (Hypothesis 1a) 
Eurobarometer 66.1, September-October 2006 
European Union Sample 
  
Assessment of the Current 








Trust in EU  
 








Tend not to 






Column Total N=12,721 N=12,010 N=24,731 
χ2 = 299.86; df= 1; p=.000; Taub = .110 (p=.000) 
 
Table 4: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Assessment of the Current 
National Economic Situation (Hypothesis 1a) 
Eurobarometer 71.3, June- July 2009 
European Union Sample 
  
Assessment of the Current 









Trust in EU 
 















Column Total N=6,303 N=20,066 N=26,369 
χ2 = 476.933; df= 1; p=.000; Taub = .134 (p=.000)  
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Table 5: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Assessment of  
the Current Economic Situation in Europe (Hypothesis 1b) 
Eurobarometer 66.1, September-October 2006 
European Union Sample 
  
Assessment of the Current 








Trust in EU 
 















 N=17,633 N=5,048 N=22,681 
χ2 = 1,676.257; df= 1; p=.000; Taub = .272 (p=.000)  
 
Table 6: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Assessment of  
the Current Economic Situation in Europe (Hypothesis 1b) 
Eurobarometer 71.3, June- July 2009 
European Union Sample 
  
Assessment of the Current 
Economic Situation in Europe 
 
Row Total 
  Good 
   % 
   Bad 
   % 
 
Trust in EU 
 















 N=7,850 N=17,139 N=24,989 
χ2 = 1,192.852; df= 1; p=.000; Taub = .218 (p=.000)   
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Table 7: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by  
Status of Occupation (Hypothesis 2a) 
Eurobarometer 66.1, September-October 2006 
European Union Sample 
  
Occupational Status 






Trust in EU 
 















Column Total N=12,135 N=819 N=12,954 
χ2 = 12.713; df= 1; p=.000; Taub =  -.031 (p=.000)  
 
 
Table 8: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by  
Status of Occupation (Hypothesis 2a) 
Eurobarometer 71.3, June- July 2009 
European Union Sample 
  
Occupational Status  






Trust in EU 
 















Column Total N=13,246 N=867 N=14,113 
χ2 = 11.001; df= 1; p=.001; Taub =  -.038 (p=.001)   
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Table 9: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Political  
Ideology (Hypothesis 2b) 
Eurobarometer 66.1, September-October 2006 
European Union Sample 
  
Political Ideology 






Trust in EU 
 















Column Total N=11,444 N=8,787 N=20,231 
χ2 = 26.245; df= 1; p=.000; Taub =  -.036 (p=.000)   
 
Table 10: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Political  
Ideology (Hypothesis 2b) 
Eurobarometer 71.3, June- July 2009 
European Union Sample 
  
Political Ideology 






Trust in EU 
 















Column Total N=12,253 N=9,089 N=21,342 




  46 
 
Table 11 : Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Symbolic Attachment to the European 
Union (Hypothesis 2c) 
Eurobarometer 66.1, September-October 2006 
European Union Sample 
  
Conjured Images 








Trust in EU  
 
Tend to Trust  
EU  
 





Tend not to 
Trust EU  
 




Column Total N=12,816 N=7,723 N=4,312 N=24,851 
χ2 = 6,620.918; df= 2; p=.000; Taub =  .485 (p=.000)   
 
Table 12: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Symbolic Attachment to the European 
Union (Hypothesis 2c) 
Eurobarometer 71.3, June-July 2009 
European Union Sample 
  
Conjured Images 








Trust in EU  
 
Tend to Trust  
EU 
 





Tend not to 
Trust EU  
 




Column Total N=12,642 N=9,337 N=4,738 N=26,717 
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Table 13: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by  
Status of Occupation, Controlling for Assessment of the Current National 
Economic Situation (Hypothesis 3a) 
Eurobarometer 66.1, September-October 2006 
European Union Sample 
























 Column Total N=5,765 N=529 N=6,294 

















 Column Total N=6,092 N=273 N=6,365 
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Table 14: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by  
Status of Occupation, Controlling for Assessment of the Current 
National Economic Situation (Hypothesis 3a) 
Eurobarometer 71.3, June-July 2009 
European Union Sample 

























 Column Total N=2,794 N=241 N=3,035 



















 Column Total N=10,086 N=608 N=10,694 
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Table 15: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Political Ideology, 
Controlling for the Current National Economic Situation (Hypothesis 3b) 
Eurobarometer 66.1, September-October 2006 
European Union Sample 
























 Column Total N=5,900 N=4,977 N=10,8077 
χ2 = 8.412; df= 1; p=.002; Taub = -.028 (p=.004)   
Assessment 
















 Column Total N=5,388 N=3,715 N=9,103 
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Table 16: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Political Ideology, 
Controlling for the Current National Economic Situation (Hypothesis 3b) 
Eurobarometer 71.3, June-July 2009 
European Union Sample 


























 Column Total N=2,769 N=2,545 N=5,314 


















 Column Total N=9,218 N=6,334 N=15,552 
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Table 17 : Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Symbolic 
Attachment to the European Union, Controlling for Assessment of the Current 
National Economic Situation (Hypothesis 3c) 
Eurobarometer 66.1, September-October 2006 
European Union Sample 























Tend not to Trust 
EU  




 Column Total N=7,408 N=3,594 N=1,615 N=12,617 












Tend not to Trust 
EU  




 Column Total N=5,200 N=3,983 N=2,630 N=11,813 
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Table 18: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Symbolic Attachment 
to the European Union, Controlling for Assessment of the Current National 
Economic Situation (Hypothesis 3c) 
Eurobarometer 71.3, June-July 2009 
European Union Sample 






















Tend not to Trust 
EU  




 Column Total N=3,657 N=1,946 N=635  N=6,238 












Tend not to Trust 
EU  




 Column Total N=8,653 N=7,190 N=3,970 N=19,813 
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Table 19: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Status of Occupation, 
Controlling for the Current Economic Situation in Europe (Hypothesis 4a) 
Eurobarometer 66.1, September-October 2006 
European Union Sample 


























 Column Total N=8,156 N=613 N=8,769 
χ2 = 3.743; df= 1; p=.029; Taub = -.021 (p=.047)   
 
Assessment 
















 Column Total N=2,469 N=136 N=2,605 
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Table 20 : Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Status of 
Occupation, Controlling for the Current Economic Situation in Europe (Hypothesis 
4a) 
Eurobarometer 71.3, June-July 2009 
European Union Sample 
























 Column Total N=3,666 N=270 N=3,936 
χ2 = 2.145; df= 1; p=.080; Taub = -.023 (p=.126)   
 
Assessment 
















 Column Total N=8,331 N=551 N=8,882 
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Table 21: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Political Ideology, 
Controlling the Current Economic Situation in Europe (Hypothesis 4b) 
Eurobarometer 66.1, September-October 2006 
European Union Sample 
 Trust in EU  Political Ideology 
Assessment 
























 Column Total N=8,028 N=6,545 N=14,573 



















 Column Total N=2,436 N=1,607 N=4,043 
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Table 22: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Political Ideology, 
Controlling for the Current Economic Situation in Europe (Hypothesis 4b) 
Eurobarometer 71.3, June-July 2009 
European Union Sample 


























 Column Total N=3,382 N=2,948 N=6,330 

















 Column Total N=8,093 N=5,533 N=13,626 
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Table 23: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Symbolic Attachment 
to the European Union, Controlling for the Current Economic Situation in Europe 
Eurobarometer 66.1, September-October 2006 (Hypothesis 4c) 
European Union Sample 






















Tend not to Trust 
EU  




 Column Total N=10,510 N=5,050 N=1,938 N=17,498 













Tend not to Trust 
EU  




 Column Total N=1,478 N=1,741 N=1,749 N=4,968 
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Table 24: Tabular Analysis of Trust in the European Union by Symbolic Attachment 
to the European Union, Controlling for the Current Economic Situation in Europe 
Eurobarometer 71.3, June-July 2009 (Hypothesis 4c) 
European Union Sample 






















Tend not to Trust 
EU  




 Column Total N=4,770 N=2,356 N=664 N=7,790 













Tend not to Trust 
EU 




 Column Total N=7,008 N=6,276 N=3,661 N=16,945 
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